The political economy of state sector restructuring in China: cross-provincial evidence 2008–2017
In: Journal of Chinese political science, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 273-299
ISSN: 1874-6357
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In: Journal of Chinese political science, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 273-299
ISSN: 1874-6357
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of contemporary China, Band 32, Heft 140, S. 264-279
ISSN: 1469-9400
This article offers a detailed analysis of the policy design of the current fourth round of state-owned enterprise (SOE) corporate restructuring in China. This time, the state's efforts to improve SOE performance hinged on attracting private capital to take ownership shares in state firms—or so-called mixed-ownership reforms. The article relies on an analysis of policy documents, interviews with policy experts in China, and a case study of local mixed-ownership reform implementation in the city of Nanjing. It discusses implications of mixed ownership for corporate governance amid changing state–Party–business relations in China. It concludes that the reform agenda consolidates a hybrid political-economic system that organically blends planning and market modes of economic coordination, as well as public and private modes of ownership. (J Contemp China/GIGA)
World Affairs Online
In: The China journal: Zhongguo-yanjiu, Band 89, S. 129-131
ISSN: 1835-8535
In: Journal of Chinese political science, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 273-299
ISSN: 1874-6357
In: Journal of contemporary China, Band 32, Heft 140, S. 264-279
ISSN: 1469-9400
In: The China quarterly, Band 250, S. 486-508
ISSN: 1468-2648
AbstractThis article analyses the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the corporate governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including a case study of a central-level SOE holding group. Relying on official documents, secondary literature and interviews with enterprise managers, government officials and academics, the article documents how the CCP has actively formalized its role in Chinese business by embedding itself in the corporate governance structure of SOEs. Through the application of Chinese indigenous administrative corporate governance concepts such as "bidirectional entry, cross appointment" and "three majors, one big," the CCP has consolidated its dominance of enterprise decision-making procedures and personnel appointment and created a hybrid, Party-led model of corporate governance. While this hybrid model can secure enterprise compliance, communication with higher state and Party organs, as well as long-term development planning, it is unlikely to help solve SOE efficiency problems and may even undermine other SOE reforms.
In: The China quarterly, Band 250, Heft 1, S. 486-508
ISSN: 1468-2648
This article analyses the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the corporate governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including a case study of a central-level SOE holding group. Relying on official documents, secondary literature and interviews with enterprise managers, government officials and academics, the article documents how the CCP has actively formalized its role in Chinese business by embedding itself in the corporate governance structure of SOEs. Through the application of Chinese indigenous administrative corporate governance concepts such as "bidirectional entry, cross appointment" and "three majors, one big," the CCP has consolidated its dominance of enterprise decision-making procedures and personnel appointment and created a hybrid, Party-led model of corporate governance. While this hybrid model can secure enterprise compliance, communication with higher state and Party organs, as well as long-term development planning, it is unlikely to help solve SOE efficiency problems and may even undermine other SOE reforms. (China Q/GIGA)
World Affairs Online
Leading cadres in China are subject to rotation. An interesting form of rotation takes place between big business and the political world. That means one fifth of China's governors and vice governors have a business background as heads of one of China's large State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). How this takes place and which qualifications the involved business leaders possess are shrouded in mystery. Based on prosopographical studies of Chinese business leaders who have participated in the Chinese Executive Leadership Program (CELP), this article attempts to open the black box. The study examines the career pathways of CELP participants in Party, government and business positions. The study shows that 84 of the 261 CELP SOE participants (2005-2018) were subsequently promoted, and 20 of these promotions were from SOEs to leading Party and government positions. In some cases, former business leaders became Party secretaries in important provinces or ministers in key ministries. The article also argues that Chinese business leaders have managed to keep their administrative ranking in the Chinese nomenklatura system. In fact, Chinese business leaders are quasi officials (zhun guan) and form an important recruitment base for leadership renewal. As such, the article suggests that the rotation of cadres within the 'Iron Triangle' of Party–government–business constitutes the main unifying and stabilising factor in the Chinese political system.
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